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This paper analyses the competitive effects of capital requirement regulation on an oligo 
polistic credit market. In the first stage, banks choose the structure of refinancing their 
assets, thereby making an imperfect commitment to a loan capacity as a function of the 
chosen degree of capitalization and the regulatory capital requirement. In the second stage, 
loan price competition takes place. It is shown that a capital requirement regulation may 
not only decrease the supply of credit through an increased marginal cost effect but can 
have an additional collusive enhancing effect resulting in even higher credit prices and 
increased profits for the banks. 
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1.  Introduction 
The soundness of the banking system is fundamental for economic wealth and 
stability. Since the banking sector is particularly vulnerable to inefficient bank runs 
and contagion resulting in bank panics, the overall aim of banking regulation is to 
secure financial stability by minimizing, ex ante, the likelihood of bank runs, re 
ducing ex post contagion, when banks fail. To reach this goal, most countries have 
introduced a governmental safety net including deposit insurances, lender of the 
last resort and bailout policies. The undesirable secondary effect of such a go 
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vernmental safety net is the destruction of the market discipline, which provides 
strong  moral  hazard  incentives  to  exploit  the  option  value  of  the  safety  net. 
Greenbaum and Thakor (1995) summarize this idea by stating: “The moral hazard 
engendered by one form of regulation, namely deposit insurance, creates the need 
for other forms of regulation such as capital requirements.” The intuition is that 
well capitalized banks have fewer incentives to increase asset risks. A bank en 
dowed with more capital is less likely to exploit the option value of the deposit 
insurance and therefore, the probability of banking default is reduced.1  
Yet, the actual impact of a regulative capital requirement on the individual 
behavior of banks and the individual incentives to take excessive risk is not undis 
puted  in  banking  theory  literature.  Berger,  Herring  and  Szegö  (1995),  Santos 
(2001), and Van Hoose (2007) offer comprehensive reviews of the theoretical 
literature on the impact of capital requirement regulation. 
Regardless of the ambiguous theoretical predictions, there is a general 
consensus2 that higher equity has a positive direct effect on the balance sheet 
structure. Banks facing a binding capital requirement have to either reduce their 
assets or increase their equity, thereby increasing the capital buffer for the case of 
asset default. Hence, a more stringent capital requirement reduces the set of states 
in which the bank defaults, and at the same time, it reduces the costs for the debt 
holder (the depositors or certain deposit insurance) given default of the bank.  
In the short run, an increase of equity to match the regulatory require 
ment may prove costly. Therefore, the immediate effect of increasing the capital 
requirements is likely to be a reduction in the total supply of loans and, according 
ly, an increase in the credit interest rate. This effect is most often analyzed in a 
perfect competition environment, but would also stay valid in a Bertrand oligopo 
ly. Thakor (1996), for instance, discusses that higher capital requirements increase 
the probability of each borrower being rationed by a bank competing in Bertrand 
competition. He argues that if the additional costs of raising equity are higher 
relative to other sources of raising money, then the bank may refrain from further 
lending and prefer to invest in marketable securities rather than in loans.  
In addition to this cost effect, the introduction of a binding capital re 
quirement regulation can have a second effect that has not yet been considered in 
banking literature. In fact, a binding capital requirement changes the sequence in 
which the strategic decisions are made, since it temporarily constrains the bank’s 
lending activities.3 This idea goes back to Edgeworth (1988) who emphasizes that 
due to exogenous capacity constraints, Bertrand oligopolists may not be able to 
serve the whole market demand and therefore would not undercut each until the 
competitive equilibrium is reached. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) generalized this 
idea for an endogenous capacity choice. In their two stage model, the oligopolists 
first compete in capacities, followed by a competition in prices, which is strictly 
constrained by the prior capacity decision. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) conclude 
that when firms commit to a certain capacity of production before price competi 
tion takes place, the capacity and prices chosen in equilibrium are identical to the 
Cournot equilibrium. As a result, banks competing in a homogenous Bertrand 
competition can generate Cournot profits instead of zero profits. The question 
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that arises is: can such a rigid capacity constraint be applied to the case of lending 
competition among banks? Freixas and Rochet (1997) even state that a capacity 
constraint may not be feasible as a starting point for a theoretical analysis in the 
context of banking.  
However, Freixas and Rochet (1997) may have overlooked that binding 
regulatory  capital  requirements4  can  affect  the  nature  of  strategic  competition 
among banks. In particular, when short term recapitalization is costly, capital re 
quirements temporarily constrain the bank’s lending activities and thereby soften 
the price competition, as already mentioned by Gehrig (1995). In a static frame 
work, a binding capital requirement regulation can, therefore, be abused to trans 
form the Bertrand competition into a sequential game with a Cournot outcome.  
In the first stage, the capital regulated banks decide on their refunding 
structure consisting of equity and deposits. In the second stage, the price competi 
tion takes place while the bank’s ability to satisfy the demand resulting from the 
pricing decision is conditioned by the raised amount of equity and the capital re 
quirement regulation. As recapitalization is assumed to be costly, the equity deci 
sion in the first stage is an imperfect commitment to capacity for bank loans. 
Notwithstanding the model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), the oligopolistic 
banks are able to extend their capacities in the second stage, but at additional 
costs. Such a flexible capacity constrained in Bertrand competition was already 
discussed by Güth (1995) and Maggi (1996) for differentiated product markets. 
The assumption of product differentiation thereby avoids one of the main short 
comings, for which the model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) has been often 
criticized. In their model, they assume that the firms compete in a homogenous 
product market, which necessitates the definition of a specific rationing rule on 
the customers that determines the specific demand addressed to each supplier. 
Yet, the derived results are not robust against changes in the specific rationing rule 
as it is formally proven by Davidson and Deneckere (1986). Assuming product 
differentiation is, thus, not only reasonable in a relationship bank lending context, 
but provides the means to well define the demand of each firm in the second 
stage for any price pair and therefore avoids the dependency of the results on a 
specific rationing rule.  
Güth (1995) and Maggi (1996) both argue that capacity constrained Ber 
trand competition yields a Cournot outcome for sufficiently high additional costs 
of the capacity extension in the second stage. Applying the Maggi (1996) model to 
a capital regulated market for loans, we analyze the effects of a capital requirement 
regulation on the strategic behavior of oligopolistic banks. We will show that, if 
costs of recapitalization are above an identified threshold, the banks would no 
longer have an incentive to undercut each other in the second stage price competi 
tion. Under such an equity commitment, thus, the Bertrand price competition 
results in a Cournot Nash equilibrium. Our comparative static analysis shows that 
an increase in capital requirement decreases the threshold that makes a first stage 
capacity decision binding. In other words, the higher the capital requirement, the 
more binding is a commitment to a credit capacity due to a certain choice of capi 
tal level. 
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Similar to the discussed direct cost effect, the described collusive5 effect 
tends to reduce the total lending resulting from less competitive prices. However, 
in contrast to the cost effect, the collusive effect is likely to generate positive prof 
its. The generated profits in turn increase the bank’s buffer against credit default 
risk on one hand and provide incentives against excessive risk taking by enhancing 
the “charter value” of the bank. An increased charter value reflects the higher 
anticipated future profits that would be lost in case of bankruptcy. The increased 
expected future losses in turn reduce the incentives to exploit the option value of 
the limited liability created by the governmental safety net, i.e. deposit insurance. 
This stabilizing effect has been discussed e.g. by Keeley (1990) and Chan, Green 
baum and Thakor (1992). Based on this charter value argumentation, Allen and 
Gale (2004) argue that regulators face a trade off between increasing competition 
and reducing stability. In line with the charter value argumentation, the identified 
collusive effect of the capital regulation, thus, further enhances stability but to the 
cost of decreased competition and a reduction in lending. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the model, in 
cluding a detailed analysis of the capital regulated bank’s cost structure. We intro 
duce the competitive environment and derive the basic results. In Section 3 we 
discuss how the capital regulation rate affects the derived results. 
2.  The Model 
2.1.  Model Setup 
We model a two stage price competition game among banks. In the first stage, 
banks  can raise  equity  followed  by  imperfect price  competition  in  the second 
stage. Each bank refinances its loan assets by equity and deposits. The refinancing 
structure of each bank is constrained by a minimum capital requirement rate. This 
rate is set by a regulator before the game starts. We will discuss the impact of the 
capital requirement rate on the outcome of our model in Section 3. We assume 
that all parties are risk neutral and the bank management is acting in the best in 
terest of the owner(s). 
The timeline of our model is as follows. In stage zero, the regulator sets 
up a certain minimum capital requirement rate. Knowing this rate, the banks raise 
equity in stage one in order to take part in the pricing competition in stage two. 
The amount of equity then determines, based on the minimum capital require 
ment regulation, a capacity to provide loans to borrowers of a certain risk class. In 
the second stage, the banks compete in prices that turn into loan quantities de 
manded by the borrowers.  
As Tirole (1988) mentions, the Bertrand and the Cournot model should 
not be seen as two exclusive models that predict contradictory outcomes of im 
perfect competition. The models rather describe the same markets with different 
cost structures. A change in the cost structure can transform a Bertrand competi 
tion into a two stage game with Cournot outcomes. In order to understand how 
capital requirement regulation influences the structure of a Bertrand competition 
among banks we therefore have a deeper look at the cost structure of capital regu 
lated banks. 
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Figure 1: The timeline of decisions taken 
 
Banks can invest solely in loans (L) demanded by the representative bor 
rowers of one risk class. The investment in assets is financed by deposits ( ) and 
equity raised in the first stage (e) and equity raised in the second stage ( ). This 
implies the balance sheet constraint: 
  ≤   +   +  .   ( 1 ) 
 
 
This constraint is binding if banks maximize profits and cash yields no re 
turns. We assume that depositors are fully insured against default at a premium 
normalized to zero. This assumption, which is often made in the literature,6 allows 
us to neglect competition on the deposits market because insured depositors are 
insensitive to the bank’s exposure to risk and ready to supply any amount of de 
posits at a deposit rate   .  
We assume that the promised return rate on equity is higher than the re 
turn on insured deposits,7 hence     =    +  , where   > 0 reflects the promised risk 
premium. Moreover, we assume that it is costly to acquire additional equity in 
stage 2. Such additional costs may represent the dilution costs that a bank faces if 
it  urgently  needs  to  raise  its  equity.8  We  adopt  this  assumption  by  defining 
   =     +   with   > 0.  
Under capital regulation, the minimum capital requirement rate    [0,1] 
forces banks to hold equity of at least    . Thus, at the beginning of the second 
stage, holding equity   results in a capacity commitment: the maximum amount of 
loans that a bank can give out is   / . This capacity commitment defines a con 
straint above which additional recapitalization costs have to be paid. If a bank 
plans to give out loans   >   /  the bank has to raise additional capital    at a 
promised rate   .  However, the bank is forced to cover with equity only a share   
of the additional loans (  −   / ). Hence,   is determined by  
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  =  max(  −  / ;0  = max(   −  ;0    ( 2 ) 
 
 
Note that with infinite recapitalization costs   the bank is unable to raise 
additional equity in the second stage. Such a setting reflects a rigid capacity con 
straint as presented in Kreps und Scheinkman (1983). An imperfect capacity con 
straint is described by finite recapitalization costs   > 0.   
We now solve the two stage game by backwards induction. 
2.2.  The Second Stage Bertrand Competition 
In the second stage, the capacity e/ , defined by the first stage equity decision, is 
an exogenous condition of the pricing decision. We first determine the cost and 
marginal cost function of a bank that provides loans L. 
Lemma 1: A capital regulated bank that raises equity at r  during the first stage 
faces, at the beginning of the second stage, the following piecewise defined cost 
function: 
 (   =  
   e    L ≤  ,
  L + c        <   ≤ e / 
(   +    L +  (   −       L >  / 
    ( 3 ) 
 
Proof: As the balance sheet constraint ( 1 ) is binding, we can write D as a func 
tion of loans and equity   =   −   −  . If the bank plans to give out loans L ≤ e, it  
finances its assets solely out of the equity raised in the first stage at cost    . Hence, 
  = 0 and   = 0. 
Intending to provide loans  L >  , the bank needs additional funds. As 
long as  e <   <  / , deposits are sufficient and no additional equity is required 
(  = 0  in the second stage. Thus, the costs of providing such a loan amount  L 
are given by     e +   (L − e . As     −    =  , providing the total loan amount costs 
the deposit rate plus the risk premium c for  .  
The third piece of the cost function depicts a loan amount beyond the 
capacity constraint  L > e / . In this case, the bank is forced to raise additional 
equity in the second stage in order to comply with the minimum capital require 
ment. According to (2), the additional equity amounts to   =    −  . Refinancing 
costs  can  therefore  be  summarized  as      +      +    .  Using  the  balance  con 
straint ( 1 ) leads to   (  −     + (   +     + (   +   +    (  −   /  , which can be 
simplified to the third piece of the cost function.■ 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the cost structure for such a capital constrained bank, 
where the light grey area depicts the fixed costs resulting from the first stage equi 
ty choice. From Lemma 1 we can easily derive the piecewise defined marginal 
cost function by differentiation: 
 
  (L  =  
0    L ≤  ,
         <   ≤   / 
   + (  +        L > e / 
    ( 4 ) 
 




Figure 2: The cost of refunding assets for lending above the capacity 
 
 
If the loan demand is low L(p  ≤ E    no marginal costs arise, since the cost of equity 
is sunk at the second stage. If e <   ≤ e /   , the marginal cost equal the cost of 
deposits. Lending above capacity requires the banks to increase its equity. Thus, 
the marginal cost of providing additional loans consist of marginal cost of equity 
plus the recapitalization cost. 
We will continue our analysis with introducing the competitive environ 
ment and further specify the demand for loans. We assume that banks compete in 
imperfect price competition. For simplicity, we concentrate on the case of two 
banks, labelled with the indices  ,  = 1,2 ;   ≠  , even though the results could be 
generalized to the case for an arbitrary number of banks. 9  
First, the oligopolistic banks choose the equity amount and then compete 
in a second stage price competition. The game is solved by backwards induction. 
Akin to the model of Maggi (1996), we use a linear representative con 
sumer model with product differentiation to describe the borrowers’ demand for 
loans. The generalized inverse demand function is given with.  
      ,    =   −     −       ( 5 ) 
 
 
In ( 5 ),     represents the loan interest rate of bank i and    the total lending of 
bank i to the borrowers. Note that   >   >   ≥ 1. If d were negative, the goods 
would be complements and if   = 0 the two goods would be independent in de 
mand. As   →    the loans become perfect substitutes. In our analysis, we will con 
centrate on the more general case of a heterogeneous market, so we do not have 
to invoke a specific customer rationing rule. The heterogeneity could emerge from 
the reputation of the bank, the specific service offered to the borrower or rela 
tionship banking combined with switching costs to the borrower. Yet, one can 
argue that bank loans are rather homogenous goods. Therefore, we will also con 
sider the particular case   →    in our analysis.    
To secure strictly positive profits we assume   >   . We further assume 
that banks only choose prices that result in non negative profits. This assumption 
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is  taken  into  account  by  introducing  non negativity  constraints  into  the profit 
maximization  problem:       −     ≤  (  −      and       ≤   −     .  Provided  that 
these constraints are not violated, the inverse demand function can be reversed10 
to obtain the direct demand curve: 
  (  ,    =   (  +    ⁄ −     (   −     ⁄ +     (b  −     ⁄    ( 6 ) 
 
 
Just as in Dixit and Norman (1980) we assume in our analysis that a firm is willing 
to meet any level of demand beyond its installed capacity provided that the price is 
above the additional costs of extending the capacity. Thus, rationing is excluded in 
our analysis.  
Banks try to maximize their profits subject to the imperfect capacity con 
straint, implicitly defined by the first stage equity choice   / . Applying Lemma 1, 
the total profit function of bank i is defined as:  
Π (  ,    =  
p  L  − r e          ≤   ,
(p  − r  L  − ce           <    ≤   / 
(p  − r  − δ(c + θ  L +θe          >   / 
    ( 7 ) 
The positive last term in the third piece of the profit function reflects the 
saved costs from raising capital in the first stage. Note that the profit function is 
not differentiable at the points    =    and    =   / .  
The best price response function of each bank is a function of the oppo 
nent’s price with different segments determined by the capacity levels chosen in 
the first round and the parameters of the model. The discontinuous points in the 
profit function thereby lead to a kinked reaction function. Hence, the best reac 
tion function is characterized by different branches.  
Lemma 2: In the second stage, the best response function R 
∗ p   can consist of 
seven branches, depending on the parameters and the chosen levels of e 
I    
    =
(         
      If  L  R 
∗ p  ,p    < e   
II    
  =
(      (              
     If  L  R 
∗ p  ,p    = e   
III    
  =
(             
      If  e  < L  R 
∗ p  ,p    <   /   
IV    
  /  =
(      (             ⁄     
     If  L (R 
∗ p  ,p   =   /   
V    
  =
(           (    (     
      If  L  R 
∗ p  ,p    >   /   
VI    
    
=
    (     
     If  L  R 
∗ p  ,p    = 0  
VII    
  =
 
 (  +    +  (  +       If  L  R 
∗ p  ,p    ≤ L 
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Proof: To prove Lemma 2, we proceed as follows. We first derive the response 
functions for each piece of the profit function. Then we consider the discontinu 
ous points. 
From  (  7  )  we  get  bank  i's  piecewise  defined  objective  function 
max   Π (  ,   .  The  best  reaction  function    
∗      is  implicitly  defined  by 
Π 
    
∗    ,    = 0. The first order conditions for the three pieces of the bank i's 
objective  function  can  be  summarized  as  (   − MC L 
  + L  = 0  with  L 
  = −
 
      . 
Substituting ( 6 ) and solving for    gives: 
   =  (  −     − (   −         +     +  (     2  ⁄    ( 8 ) 
Substituting ( 4 ) into ( 8 ) gives the branches I, III and V of bank i’s best 
response function:  
Branch I: If the best reaction to the price chosen by bank j results in a 
demand L  R 
∗ p  ,p    < e , the marginal costs in the second stage are    L(p   = 0.  
Substituting MC and solving for     gives the best response   
    ≡
(         
   . 
Branch III: Similarly, for e  < L  R 
∗ p  ,p    <   /  the second stage marginal 
costs  are     L(p   =     resulting  in  the  best  reaction   
− ≡
( −   +   +brD
2  .  The 
intuition is, that a relatively low price of the opponent induces a high demand for 
loans from the opponent bank and only few loans demanded from bank i such 
that the demand is smaller than the capacity. Therefore, the optimal response   
∗ is 
the Bertrand price for producing below the capacity constraint. 
Branch V: If the best reaction to the opponent’s price results in a demand 
L  R 
∗ p  ,p    >   /  the optimal price response is   
  =
(           (    (     
   . If the 
opponent chooses a high price, such that the residual demand for loans from bank 
i raises above the installed capacity, the optimal response is to expand capacity, 
taking recapitalization costs   into account. 
Branches II and IV result from the discontinuous jumps in the marginal 
cost curve at the points where L  R 
∗ p  ,p    = e  and  L  R 
∗ p  ,p    =   / . These 
equalities implicitly describe the best response price. Solving for the best reaction 
we get: 
Branch II:    
  ≡
(      (            
    and 
Branch IV:   
  /  ≡
(      (        /     
   
 
These two functions give the possible price combinations that make the 
loan demand of bank i just equal to the precommitted equity amount or the capac 
ity respectively. 
Branch VI results from the non negativity constraints on demand in the 
optimization  problem:  0 ≤    =   (  +    ⁄ −     (   −     ⁄ +     (b  −     ⁄ .  A  price 
pair that results in a negative demand for the opponent makes the non negativity 
constraint binding. Solving for    yields   
    
≡
    (     
  . 
Branch  VII  is  the  monopoly  price  solving  the  maximization  problem 
  
  ≡        (p  − r  − δ(c + θ   L (p   +θE     that  is  solved  by    
  =
 
 (  +    +
 (  +    .  
The intuition behind this result is that the increase in the opponent’s price 
for loans by bank j raises the loans demanded from bank i and allows for further Strategic Effects of Capital Requirements in Bertrand Competition  10 
increases in   . If the opponent’s price choice is higher than the price determined 
by L  R 
∗ p  ,p    = 0, then bank i’s best respond is to further increase its price until 
the best response price equals the monopoly price. Yet, bank i would only increase 
its price up to the monopoly price. For any further increase in the opponent’s 
price, it would not be optimal to increase also     since the monopoly price is by 
definition, the profit maximizing price. The best response price is, thus, indepen 
dent of the opponent’s price and the best response function horizontal. ■ 
After we have identified all feasible parts of the best response function we 
categorize the critical opponent’s price levels for which each function becomes a 
part of bank i' s best response function.  
Proposition 1: The best response function of bank i is the piecewise defined 
function: 
  











   p 
      if          p  < p             
p 
          if      p  ≤ p  ≤ p    
p 
        if       p  < p  < p 
 
p 
  /       if       p 
  ≤ p  ≤ p 
 
   p 
       if p 
  < p  ≤ p 
    
    p 
    
 if p 
    
< p  < p 
     
p 
   if p 




Proof: Bank i chooses the optimal price    along its residual demand curve for a 
given   . As    increases the optimal price reaction is thereby given by the identi 
fied response functions. The intersections of the respective response functions 
determine the individual threshold values for   . The closed forms of the thresh 
old values are given in the Appendix. ■ 
 
The entire best reaction function of bank i, denoted as   
∗    , is depicted 
in Figure 3. 
Proposition 2: If   ≠   then the equilibrium price vector p∗ = (p 
∗,p 
∗  in each sec 
ond stage subgame is unique. This equilibrium is defined by the intersection of 
either branch I,II, III, VI or V. 
Proof: Branches VI and VII are not feasible candidates for a Nash equilibrium 
since the firm earning zero profits could strictly increase its profits by offering a 
lower credit price and, thus, would be strictly better off by deviating from the high 
price decision. The remaining branches define a best reaction function that is 
kinked, but continuous and monotone increasing. The slope of branches I, III and 
V equals d/2b and the slope of branches II and IV is equal to d/b.  
With b >   > 0 all branches of the best reaction function have a slope be 
tween 0 and 1. Hence, the intersection between the two banks’ best response cor 
respondences is unique. ■ 
 
For the particular case where   =   the slope of branch II and IV would 
   (   
   
= 1, 
such that an intersection of the reaction functions at these branches give a conti 
nuum of equilibria as illustrated in Figure 4. 





Yet, even a slight degree of differentiation results in a unique equilibrium 
solution. Since this is true for both a
intersection of the best response function
in the price subgame for any pair of 
equilibrium is determined b
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Figure 3: The best reaction function in the second stage 
Yet, even a slight degree of differentiation results in a unique equilibrium 
is true for both agents, whenever   ≠   there must be a unique 
tion of the best response functions that defines a pure strategy equilibrium 
in the price subgame for any pair of capacities installed in the first stage. Since the 
librium is determined by a unique intersection of 5 branches, there are 
second stage equilibrium types in our symmetric model.  
 








Yet, even a slight degree of differentiation results in a unique equilibrium 
there must be a unique 
that defines a pure strategy equilibrium 
installed in the first stage. Since the 
there are five 
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Knowing the possible intersections of the reaction functions in the sec 
ond stage, it is possible to determine the first stage payoffs as a function of the 
respective capacity choices.  
Note that, in the long run, Branch I and II would result in negative profits 
of both banks and thus a breakdown of the market. We, therefore, restrict our 
analysis to the cases where banks refinance their assets with deposits in order to 
make non negative long run profits.  
In  general,  the  optimal  price  choice  is  implicitly  defined  at  the  point 
where the marginal benefit, reflected by an increased demand resulting from lo 
wering the price, equals the marginal costs of expanding the supply of loans. For 
very low additional costs (  → 0  the capacity choice in the first stage would not be 
binding and the equilibria of the two stage game would coincide with the Bertrand 
equilibrium in quantities and prices. 
If the costs of adjusting equity are significantly different from zero (  > 0  
the highest price that can be sustained as equilibrium is, thus: 
  
  =
 (  −     +  (   + (  +      
(2  −   
.   ( 9 ) 
 
 
With an increasing cost factor   as the highest attainable price, the symmetric 
Bertrand equilibrium price with recapitalization cost also increases. If the recapita 
lization costs are equal to or higher than the critical value   , the highest attainable 
Bertrand equilibrium price (with recapitalization costs) equals to the Cournot price 
for a supply within the capacity constraint. This critical value is implicitly defined 
at the point where the Bertrand best price response with marginal costs including 
the cost or recapitalization    + (  +     equals the Cournot best response price 
with marginal costs equal to    +   : 
   =
 ²(  −    −    
(2  −     
,   ( 10 ) 
 
 
Hence, if the short term expansion costs are above this critical level, it would not 
be profitable to provide loans above the capacity. In other words, the capacity 
commitment becomes strictly binding. As argued by Maggi (1996)   determines, 
thus, the irrevocability of the precommitment. The higher the  , the more effec 
tive the capacity commitment device is. The interesting implication for the regula 
tion of banks is the impact of the regulatory requirement on the critical level of 
recapitalization costs.  
Lemma 3: A higher minimum capital requirement ratio   reduces   .  
Proof: Differentiating the critical cost level with respect to the capital requirement 
gives: 
   
  
= −
 ²(  −    
(2  −     ²   ( 11 ) 
 
 
Since   >    and   >  11, the partial derivatives clearly indicate a negative relation 
between the capital requirement and the critical recapitalization cost level that 
changes the Bertrand competition into Cournot equilibrium outcomes.■ 
                                                       
11 As d approaches b (the goods are nearly homogenous) this value approaches  −
(     
 ²  , which is 
clearly negative. Strategic Effects of Capital Requirements in Bertrand Competition 
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2.3.  The First Stage Equity Choice 
Anticipating the best reaction of the second stage, bank i will choose, in the first 
stage, an optimal level of equity that results in a capacity equal to the equilibrium 
demand of the second stage. It would not be profit enhancing to deviate from a 
capacity choice that equals demand in the second stage since equity is expensive. 
A profit maximizing bank therefore takes no more equity than it is required by 
regulation to satisfy the loans demanded in the second stage. Reducing the equity 
to the amount the required loans demand, in the second stage, would not affect 
the demand and prices but saves costs. Similarly, a capacity below the anticipated 
equilibrium demand would not be optimal because raising additional equity in the 
first stage would save costs of recapitalization in the second stage without influen 
cing the equilibrium prices or demand in the second stage. Hence, in the first stage 
equilibrium, a profit maximizing bank will raise the exact amount of equity that 
satisfies the equilibrium demand in the second stage   /  =    .  
Applying this argumentation to both agents, it becomes clear that only the 
interceptions of branches IV of the best response function qualify for a Nash 
equilibrium of the whole game. This interception defines a capacity clearing equi 
librium where the prices chosen in the second stage guarantee a demand that just 
clears the capacity defined by the equity raised in the first stage. 
Lemma  4:  When 0 <   <   ,  the  equilibrium  equity  choice  is  characterized  by 
   =     (  
    and prices equal to   
 . 
Proof: For intermediate recapitalization costs, the banks would still have incen 
tives to revoke the capacity commitment. When installing Cournot capacities they 
would have the incentives to undercut the prices of the opponent. Thus, the Nash 
equilibrium for intermediate costs is exactly the capacity that allows to meet the 
demanded quantity of Bertrand prices for marginal costs equal to (   +  (  +   ), 
which was defined above as   
 . For a price that exactly equals the marginal costs 
with recapitalization, the banks have no incentives to undercut the opponent in 
prices and thus, no bank will deviate from the strategy. Anticipating this price pair, 
the optimal capacity chosen is, thus,      ⁄ =     (  
  12. ■ 
In the second stage, the optimal prices chosen then generate a demand 
that exactly clears the capacity. Without any excess demand above capacity, no 
recapitalization costs occur to the bank. Hence, the imperfect capacity commit 
ment in the first stage allows banks to set their prices higher (by     than the mar 
ginal costs that actually occur to the bank and therefore raise profits. 
Now consider the case where costs are   ≥   . Given that in equilibrium 
the capacity decision will equal the anticipated demand, firms know that the op 
timal price in the second stage will be the intersection of branch two of both 
agents. The symmetric anticipated equilibrium price will be defined by 
  
    
=   −      ⁄ −      ⁄ .   ( 12 ) 
 
 
Both banks simultanously maximize the objective function with respect to the 
constraint of the optimal equity level. 
                                                       
12 Formally the optimal capacity is the quantity equal to the demand for the price pair that maximizes 
max(   −    +     (  ,    subject to    =   (  ,j   ⁄   and   
  ≤   
∗ ≤   
 . 
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   =  p 
    
− r     δ ⁄ − ce    ( 13 ) 
 
 
The First Order Condition then gives the optimal equity choice 
e 
∗ =
a − (r  + δc 
(2b + d δ
   ( 14 ) 
 
 
The second stage best reply to the installed capacity is then the Cournot prices: 
p∗ =
(ab + (b + d (r  + δc  
2b + d
   ( 15 ) 
 
 
The optimal symmetric capacity and the according prices result in the follow 
ing symmetric profits: 
 
Π∗ =
  a − (r  + δc  
 
(2b + d   .   ( 16 ) 
 
If banks would compete in a Cournot competition on quantities with symmetric 
costs, they would select their optimal output as a function of the other bank's 
optimal loan supply.  
Lemma 5: The symmetric Cournot equilibrium is given by the Cournot quantity 
 
  =
 −(  +   
2 +  ,  leading  to  the  Cournot  equilibrium  price      =
   (    (      
      and 
equilibrium payoffs  
  =
 ( −(  +    ²
(2 +  ² . 
Proof: Competing in a Cournot competition, bank i maximizes the profit function 
   =       ,    − (   +         with  respect  to  the  optimal  loan  amount.  The  first 
order condition for a maximum determines the best response function of bank i 
to any amount of loans supplied by bank j, which is: 
       =
  −     − (   +    
 
.   ( 17 ) 
 
 
The banks’ best response functions enable us to derive the Cournot equilibrium. ■ 
Proposition 3: For recapitalization costs   ≥    the equilibrium of the two stage 
game is characterized by the Cournot equilibrium prices and quantities. 
Proof: Substitute ( 1 ) into ( 14 ) and compare with Lemma 5. ■ 
3.  Policy Implications and Discussion 
A minimum capital requirement can turn a Bertrand competition in the loans 
market into a Cournot equilibrium resulting in lower credit output, higher credit 
prices and higher profits for oligopolistic banks. In contradiction to the literature 
arguing that regulatory capital requirements increase the cost of producing loans 
and thereby reducing the profits of the banks, this paper shows that the regulation 
can also increase the bank’s profits, and thus, the charter value of the bank in 
excess of the increased cost of equity. Following the argumentation of the charter 
value hypothesis, such increased profits reduce the bank’s risk taking incentives. 
This decrease in the bank’s exposure to risk may enhance the stability in banking, 
however, to the social costs of an additional reduction in lending. These two ef 
fects may alter the decision on the optimal requirement rate by the regulator in a Strategic Effects of Capital Requirements in Bertrand Competition 
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stage zero. In such a zero stage, the regulator has to balance, on one hand, the aim 
of stabilizing the banking sector against the aim of enhancing competition and 
efficiency.  
Proposition 4: A critical value of the minimum capital requirement   exists such 
that, whenever   ≥    then, ceteris paribus,   
∗ =    (resulting from   
∗ =   ). 
This leads to equilibrium profits   
∗ =   .  
Proof: Holding the recapitalization costs fixed, equation ( 10 ) implicitly defines 
   which is the critical level of a minimum capital requirement that may be chosen 
by the regulator at a stage zero. This value leads to the critical regulatory capital 
requirement  that  induces  collusive  behavior  among  price  competing  banks.  A 
requirement equal to or above this level, allows banks to gain Cournot profits by 
further raising prices and thereby decreasing lending.■ 
 
When setting the minimum capital requirement for banks, the regulator, 
thus, not only needs to balance the cost effect but also the identified collusive 
effect against enhanced stability to find an optimal regulatory capital requirement. 
The analysis has shown that a binding regulatory capital requirement re 
duces the incentives of competing banks to undercut in prices. This collusive ef 
fect results from the strategic complementarity of prices. The intensification of 
capital requirements restricts the market volume and thus results in higher interest 
rates. The banks have fewer incentives to engage in fierce Bertrand competition. 
The intensity of the price competition in the second stage thereby depends on the 
cost of recapitalization and the level of capital requirement. The higher the costs 
of recapitalization  , the higher the mark up on the Bertrand price and the lower 
the loans demanded in the second stage. This holds until the cost of recapitaliza 
tion reaches the critical level   
  =  
 . For any costs equal or above the critical 
level, it will be optimal to install Cournot capacities in the first stage and ask for 
Cournot prices in the second stage, which maximizes the non cooperative equili 
brium profits. Therefore, this paper offers a justification for the usage of the 
Cournot model in the context of banking.  
In contrast to the literature on the impact of capital regulation, this analy 
sis suggests that banks in fierce Bertrand competition may benefit from the intro 
duction of a binding capital constraint due to regulatory capital requirements. This 
suggests a certain demand for regulation on the side of banks. 
From the point of view of the regulator this result has ambiguous implica 
tions.  On  one  hand,  the  regulator  might  prefer  Bertrand  competition  among 
banks with lower prices and higher loan supply for the macroeconomic benefits of 
efficiency as described for example by Smith (1998). On the other hand, the high 
er profits resulting from a reduction in competitive fierceness may further stabilize 
the banking sector. Assuming that the regulator aims at an optimal trade off be 
tween incentives for competitiveness of bank services and the solvency and sta 
bility of the industry, the effects on the strategic interaction among banks may be 
minor compared to other incentive effects of the requirement that influence the 
stability of banks. Nevertheless, they should be taken into account in the design of 
prudential  banking  regulation.  The  collusive  effect  should  also  be  considered, 
especially in the discussion of an increase of capital requirements. Since banking 
regulation also tries to reduce the bank’s exposure to risk, it will be important to 
analyze the capital constraint effects on a bank’s portfolio risk decision. Strategic Effects of Capital Requirements in Bertrand Competition  16 
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